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They Get Knocked Down. 
Do They Get Up Again? 








Royal Holloway, University of London
“I get knocked down, but I get up again.”
Chumbawumba, 1997
Industrial restructuring, changes in technology, and recession are
all associated with worker displacement, the involuntary separation of
an employee from a job.  Workers also leave jobs for personal reasons,
but because these are considered voluntary actions and presumably not
as closely linked with economic hardship, there is less concern over the
consequences of this type of movement.  The media in Britain and
Australia, and perhaps because of this the general public, are also pre-
occupied with the idea of declining job security (see, for example,
Kelley, Evans, and Dawkins 1998).  Whilst job security is difficult to
quantify, public concern could arise not only from a belief that a long-
term employment relationship is now less likely, but also from a belief
that, if unlucky enough to lose a job, a replacement job is likely to be of
lower quality, to pay lower wages, and to be less stable.
302 Borland, Gregg, Knight, and Wadsworth
In this chapter we examine the consequences of job loss for dis-
placed workers in Britain and Australia.  Fallick (1996) and Kletzer
(1998) provide useful summaries of over ten years of research into the
issue in North America.  As yet, however, the evidence from Britain
and Australia is sparse. 
For Britain, Gregory and Jukes (1997) provided the first evidence
of the effects of unemployment on the subsequent earnings of a sample
of unemployed male benefit claimants.  They find, on average, an earn-
ings penalty of around 10 percent compared with men who remain in
jobs.  The research in this chapter draws on data from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) over the period 1991 to 1996 to
broaden the scope of inquiry on job displacement in Britain by includ-
ing all unemployment spells (claimant or otherwise) and spells of eco-
nomic inactivity (allowing for discouraged job seekers), together with
information for women and/or part-time working.  The analysis high-
lights which groups are most likely to experience displacement, which
groups are most likely to get back into work, and the earnings changes
associated with reentry into work.
For Australia, a range of case-study–type evidence is available
which suggests that displaced workers face considerable difficulties in
obtaining new jobs, but does not provide clear conclusions on the
effects of displacement on future wages (Borland 1998).  In this chap-
ter, data from two sources are used to extend existing research.  First,
aggregate-level data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)
and Labor Force Survey (LFS) are used to describe patterns and trends
in the incidence of displacement and labor market outcomes for dis-
placed workers.  Second, individual-level data from the Youth in Tran-
sition Survey (YTS) are used to examine the consequences of
displacement for young workers in Australia in the mid 1980s and
early 1990s.  The analysis provides a more detailed treatment of post-
displacement employment and wage outcomes for displaced workers
in Australia than in previous studies—for example, by presenting
information on average employment outcomes over the two-year
period following displacement. 
The next section provides background information on the labor
markets in Britain and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s.  The third sec-
tion describes the institutional and legal framework surrounding job
displacement in Britain and Australia.  The fourth section outlines the
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data sources used for each country and presents findings from analysis
of the incidence of displacement and the consequences of job loss.  The
last section presents a summary of the main results for each country
and attempts to offer a comparative perspective on how institutional
differences between Britain and Australia might have affected wage
and employment outcomes for displaced workers in those countries.
Differences between the data sources—in particular, the Australian
data source is restricted to younger workers whereas the British data
source covers all age groups—mean that the scope for such compari-
sons is somewhat limited.  However, some conclusions regarding the
role of institutional factors are preferred.
LABOR MARKET BACKGROUND 
Britain
At the beginning of the nineties, Britain entered a recession that
was to last until the end of 1992.  Unemployment reached a peak of
around 3 million, some 10.5 percent of the workforce, in the spring of
the following year.  The recession primarily affected men.  Male
employment fell by 1.3 million in the three years between 1990 and
1993, while female employment fell by only 150,000 over the same
period.  The economic downturn helped increase the movement of
many men—mostly, but not entirely, over age 50—into economic
inactivity.  The number of men outside the labor force grew by around
700,000 over the recession period and continued to rise over the rest of
the nineties, albeit more slowly.  Manufacturing and the distribution
and retail sectors bore the brunt of the fall in employment: 600,000
jobs were lost in manufacturing between 1990 and 1993 and 400,000
jobs in distribution and trade.  Younger workers were hit worst by the
recession.  The employment rate for those aged 20–24 years fell from
75.5 percent to 66.0 percent, some 500,000 workers, from 1990 to
1993, compared with the national fall from 75.2 percent to 70.6 percent
over the same period.
The labor market in the early years of recovery was dominated by a
rise in the share of part-time and temporary jobs.  By the end of 1996,
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when the British sample stops, the employment rate had recovered to
72 percent, up by some 600,000 from its 1993 low.  Of the net new-job
creation 200,000 were for full-time work and 400,000 for part-time
work.  Half of the net growth in employment was accounted for by
temporary jobs.  Youth (20–24) employment fell, however, by a further
300,000.  This may, in part, be explained by an increased enrollment in
tertiary education.  Three-quarters of all net employment growth
between 1993 and 1996 was accounted for by the public sector and
finance industries.  Over the same period the increase in earnings ine-
quality that had begun at the start of the eighties continued apace, until
1996 when inequality stopped rising.  By 1996, the gross hourly earn-
ings of the lowest decile had fallen to 53 percent of the median, while
hourly earnings of the top decile had risen to 220 percent of median
earnings.  The typical entrant back into work after a spell of non-
employment could expect to receive earnings around the bottom quar-
tile of the aggregate earnings distribution, some 69 percent of median
earnings in 1996.
Australia
Individual-level data on displaced workers in Australia used in this
study are from the early to mid 1980s and early 1990s, and primarily
for workers aged 18 to 22 years.  Hence in this subsection a range of
descriptive information on the Australian labor market in the 1980s
and 1990s—in aggregate and for persons aged 15–24 years—is pre-
sented.
In 1978, the average unemployment rate in Australia was 7.8 per-
cent, with that for 15- to 24-year-olds at 14.4 percent.  Both these rates
attained a local maximum in 1983 at  9.9 and 17.9 percent, respec-
tively; declined to a trough of 5.7 and 10.4 percent in 1989; and rose to
a higher peak in the recession of the early 1990s of 10.7 percent for the
population as a whole in 1993, and 19.5 percent for youth in 1992.
This 1990s recession was also distinguished by a substantially larger
share of the unemployed population in long-term unemployment; for
example in 1993, 36.9 percent of the unemployed had been in that state
for over a year, compared with 31.2 percent in 1984.  Some reversal of
the above increases has now taken place.  In May 1998 the rate of
unemployment for the working-age population was at 8 percent.
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Along with being higher for younger than older labor-force partici-
pants, the incidence of unemployment has been particularly high for
those with low levels of educational attainment or whose last job was
in an unskilled blue-collar occupation, and for some immigrant groups
(Borland and Kennedy 1998).
Changes in employment/population and labor-force participation
rates also took place in the 1980s and 1990s.  The aggregate employ-
ment/population rate varied procyclically but displayed little overall
trend.  As in most industrialized countries, however, the stability of the
aggregate employment/population rate disguises opposing trends for
males and females.  For females both employment and labor-force par-
ticipation have increased since the mid 1970s, while for males there
has been a decrease in participation over this period (see for example,
Gregory 1991 and EPAC 1996).1  Focusing on persons aged 15–24
years, employment and labor-force participation also remained remark-
ably constant throughout this period (employment at about 60 percent,
participation at about 68 percent).  However, significant changes
occurred in the composition of employment: the full-time employment/
population rate declined substantially—from 52 percent in 1980 to 38
percent in 1995—while the part-time employment/population rate
increased to compensate.  Underlying the change in the composition of
employment has been an increase in schooling and university partici-
pation, from 34 percent in 1987 to 44 percent in 1995.
The 1980s and 1990s in Australia were characterized by relatively
little real wage growth.  Between 1978 and 1984, average real weekly
earnings of full-time employees grew by a total of 7.6 percent, but fell
after that.  Only by 1995 had average real weekly earnings recovered to
their 1984 level.  These trends were similar for youths, although
declines in the 1980s were larger for them.   (This latter finding could
be due to changes in the composition of the full-time youth labor
force.)  Earnings dispersion was relatively stable from the early to late
1980s, but then increased during the first half of the 1990s (Gregory
1993 and Borland and Wilkins 1996).
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INSTITUTIONS
Institutional factors are generally supposed to have an important
role in determining both the incidence of worker displacement and sub-
sequent outcomes for displaced workers.  In this section we identify the
key institutional features which are likely to be relevant for under-
standing what happens to displaced workers—employment-protection
legislation; the unemployment benefit system; and wage-setting insti-
tutions.  Employment-protection legislation may affect whether and
how firms are able to lay off workers.  Differential costs of layoffs may
also influence the incidence of worker displacement.  Unemployment
benefits may affect the jobless duration and search activities of dis-
placed workers.  Wage-setting institutions help determine both the
wages displaced workers surrender and their wages at reemployment.
Britain
Employment protection
How easy is it for firms to make their employees redundant in Brit-
ain and what are the costs to firms?  Employment-protection legisla-
tion, as covered by the Statutory Redundancies Payments Scheme
(1965), has operated largely unchanged since its inception.  This cov-
ers mandatory severance pay, advance notice, legal requirements, and
procedures for dismissal.  There are relatively few legislative con-
straints on the ability of firms to make redundancies.  The qualifying
period—before general rights exist to claim redundancy payments and
unfair dismissal—was extended, first, from six months to one year in
1979 and, then, to two years in 1985 for full-time jobs and five years
for part-time jobs.  In 1995, an EU antidiscrimination ruling was
brought in which equalized the qualification period at two years tenure
for all.  If a worker qualifies for redundancy rights then the entitle-
ments are as follows:
• there is a minimum notice period of one week for each year of
service, up to a maximum of 12 weeks.
• an employer must make a lump-sum payment to any employee
dismissed because of redundancy, calculated using a formula
based on length of service and age.  This is then multiplied by the
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worker’s weekly earnings (with a ceiling imposed currently at
£210), as follows:
– 0.5  week’s pay for each complete year of service between ages
18 and 21,
– 1 week’s pay for each complete year of service between ages 22
and 40,
– 1.5 weeks’ pay for each complete year of service between ages
41 and 60.
There is a maximum, national, service period of 20 years.  Service
before age 18 and after age 60 does not count toward redundancy-com-
pensation entitlement.  Since qualification for these general rights
requires two years’ tenure, then the minimum notification period is two
weeks, irrespective of hours worked, and the minimum compensation
lies between one and three weeks’ pay.  The maximum amount an
employer might be required to pay as a statutory redundancy payment
is £6,300 (20 x 1.5 x 210), around one-third average annual earnings.
Unions tend to negotiate supplements that raise the compensation and
notification period substantially.  Employers sometimes make larger
payments as an incentive for the workforce to take “voluntary” redun-
dancy.  A statutory redundancy payment is not liable to tax and any
nonstatutory “golden handshake” is also tax free if it is under £30,000.
If the employer fails to  make the statutory payment, the employee
must present a complaint in writing to an Industrial Tribunal within six
months.  A right to time off during the period of dismissal notice to
look for work or make arrangements for training exists after two years
of employment.  There is a penalty of two-fifths of weekly pay for each
week if the employer does not allow this.  The employee also has the
right to have recognized trade unions consulted by employers before
redundancy proposals are put into effect.  This requires no minimum
length of employment.  Employers wishing to make 100 or more work-
ers redundant at the same time are obliged to give 90-days’ notice to
the Secretary of State for Employment and to consult with the employ-
ees’ representatives.  Firms wishing to make between 20 and 100
workers redundant are obliged to give 30-days’ notice to the same par-
ties (Selwyn 1996).  Workers on fixed-term contracts are excluded
from redundancy rights if they agree in writing to exclude their rights
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to make any claim, even if their jobs last for more than two years.
Such a clause is now common in many fixed-term contract agreements.
General rights apply against “unfair dismissal”  after two years, includ-
ing an award of compensation by an Industrial Tribunal if a claim is
made within three months of the dismissal.  Any employer who dis-
misses a woman for some reason connected to her pregnancy, for
example, may well be dismissing her unfairly.
Unemployment benefits
Once displaced, what can workers expect to receive from the state?
To receive any benefit workers must first register with the state
employment service and sign a weekly declaration that they are avail-
able for, and actively seeking, work.  The British unemployment bene-
fit system encompasses both contribution-based insurance (UI) and
means-tested assistance (UA).  Both benefits are paid out of general
taxation revenue.  National Insurance Contributions (NIC) are compul-
sory for all employees earning above a minimum level, currently £63 a
week, as a given percentage of gross pay.  Employees who do not pay
NICs are not eligible for UI payments and must therefore apply for
means-tested assistance.  No contributions are required on jobs paying
below £63 a week, but NICs are levied on all earnings once the wages
rise above this threshold.  This profile creates what is called an “entry
fee,” crossing above which incurs a sharp rise in the tax burden.  As a
result, more part-time jobs may be created than would otherwise be,
and this may affect the new-job wage-offer distribution and hence the
cost of job loss.2
To be entitled to contributory unemployment benefit a displaced
worker must have been employed continuously for two years immedi-
ately prior to displacement and must have earned a wage higher than
the contribution lower limit (£63 per week).  Before 1988 a worker
could have been credited with NICs during a spell of unemployment
and still qualified for benefit.  Since 1983, unemployment benefit in
Britain has been paid at a flat rate (£48.25 in 1996), irrespective of pre-
vious earnings for a set period.  In 1996, the duration period for receipt
of UI was reduced from 12 to 6 months.  After exhaustion of UI, claim-
ants are transferred to means-tested assistance payments.  This benefit
is levied at the level of the household rather than the individual and
pays a claimant the difference between the household’s weekly net
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income and their needs level or “applicable amount.”  UI claimants can
also claim UA simultaneously since the flat rate UI payment is nor-
mally below the amount a family would get on UA.  In addition, those
living in rented accommodations can claim means-tested help with
their housing costs (Housing Benefit).  Successful claimants will nor-
mally have all of their rent paid, except a nominal amount.  Those who
own their residences can claim help with their mortgage payments after
a 6-month spell of unemployment.  Council Tax Benefit, help with
local authority taxes, is also paid to those on means-tested benefit, such
that 100 percent of their Council Tax is paid.
Individuals can receive means-tested assistance indefinitely, pro-
vided they satisfy eligibility requirements.  For an unemployed worker
this requires a weekly declaration of availability for work at the local
Jobcentre, administered by the government employment service.
Recent attention has been given to the growing numbers of economi-
cally inactive men of working age.  Over most of the period covered by
this chapter, many of these individuals were claiming long-term sick-
ness benefit (SI).  This is a means-tested benefit paying around £30
above the rate for UA, with eligibility determined by a general practi-
tioner.  Claimants could move off unemployment benefit into SI after a
period of six months claiming means-tested income support.  Claims
were also allowed after a 6-month period out of work receiving
employer-contributed statutory sick pay.  It is possible therefore that
some displaced workers who could not find a job immediately may
have ended up receiving a sickness benefit.  In 1995, concerned with
the growth in claims, the government replaced SI with Incapacity Ben-
efit, restricting the role of the general practitioner to an “objective” test
of a medical basis for the ability to perform work-related activities.
These myriad variations in benefits and the uncertainty surround-
ing likely wage offers make the calculation of potential replacement
rates facing displaced workers very difficult.  OECD estimates of
“typical replacement ratios” for the United Kingdom are shown in
Table 4.A1 in the appendix.  Replacement rates are relatively low until
housing benefits are taken into account.  Thereafter they approach par-
ity with the income brought home by a worker earning two-thirds of
the average production worker’s salary. 
The employment service offers a range of training, advice, and
support schemes aimed at helping the unemployed back into work.
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Claimants are required to produce evidence that they are actively seek-
ing work and/or had “good cause” for turning down a job they were
offered.  They are also encouraged, but not obliged, to complete a Back
to Work Plan containing goals that they have to achieve during the
unemployment spell.  This is reviewed after an unemployment spell of
13 weeks and from then on the claimant is referred to the plethora of
support schemes and advisory networks available at that time.  These
initiatives target various categories of unemployment duration—cur-
rently JobClubs (6 months unemployed), JobPlan Workshops (12
months), Restart courses (24 months)—and try to match jobseekers to
posted vacancies, placement in relevant employment-subsidy pro-
grams, remotivation counselling, and improvement in the extent and
quality of their job search.  Recruitment subsidies and work programs
were not in place during the sample period, though the government has
recently introduced a wage subsidy scheme, The New Deal, for those
unemployed in excess of six months.  Schmitt and Wadsworth (1998)
provide more details on changes to the benefit system over time and
the consequences for unemployment outflows.
Wage-setting institutions
What are the principal forces shaping wages in Britain and what
might be the consequences for displaced workers looking to reenter
work?  Wages are relatively free of regulations governing pay determi-
nation.  Over the sample period, the Conservative administration
encouraged, but did not mandate, decentralized determination of
wages.  There was no national minimum-wage regulation applicable in
the United Kingdom over the sample period.  Wages Councils, which
had previously set minimum rates of pay for around 2 million low-paid
workers in selected industries, were abolished in 1993, except in agri-
culture.  Union density in Britain, which continues to fall, is currently
estimated to be around 30 percent, and only around 20 percent in the
private sector.  Collective bargaining coverage has no legal status.
Employers must agree as to whether unions are recognized for negotia-
tion purposes.  Recent estimates show that collective representation has
also been considerably undermined, with just 37 percent of employees
covered by collective agreements in 1996, but with 70 percent cover-
age  in large public sector workplaces (Cully and Woodland 1997).  If
pay is not determined through collective bargaining,  then management
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or a “review body” in the public sector decides (Beatson 1995).  Gregg
and Wadsworth (1997)  provided an analysis of  the changing nature of
wages being offered to the non-employed.
Australia
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia assigns pow-
ers to make legislation between state and federal governments.  The
power to regulate industrial relations matters is divided between these
two: Federal powers are those explicitly stated in the Constitution, and
residual powers are assigned to the states.  For example, section
51(xxxv) of the Constitution allows the federal government to make
laws with respect to “conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one
state.”
Regulation of the terms and conditions of employment in Australia
occurs through: a) Provisions of state and federal government work-
place relations legislation; and b) The “award system” whereby a sys-
tem of industrial tribunals specify and enforce a set of minimum terms
and conditions for workers in specific occupation or industry groups.
In what follows we discuss these two sources of employment regu-
lation in turn.
Employment protection
In Australia any employment contract of indefinite duration
between an employer and employee will generally be terminable by
notice (Creighton, Ford, and Mitchell 1993, p. 225).  Currently, regula-
tion of the appropriate notice period for worker retrenchment in Aus-
tralia occurs through workplace relations legislation and through the
wage-setting system.  First, some states in Australia have enacted leg-
islation which requires (or can be used to require) employers to provide
advance notification of dismissal (Social Justice Consultative Council,
1992).  Second, awards setting out minimum terms and conditions of
employment may contain provisions relating to minimum-notice peri-
ods.
Prior to 1984 most awards (federal and state) contained provisions
to the effect that “Employment . . . shall be terminated by a week’s
notice on either side given at any time during the week or by the pay-
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ment or forfeiture of a week’s wages at the case may be” (Creighton,
Ford, and Mitchell 1993, p. 225).  The Termination, Change and
Redundancy (TCR) Test Case decision handed down by the Federal
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in 1984, however, provided
a stronger set of conditions governing worker retrenchment which
could henceforth be included in awards.  These conditions specify min-
imum requirements for advance notification of retrenchment, sever-
ance payments, and such other employer obligations as providing time
off for job interviews.  
Provisions from the TCR Test Case relating to advance notice and
severance payments for retrenched workers are as follows (Creighton,
Ford, and Mitchell 1993, pp. 225–226):
• Advance Notice:
“(i) Where an employer has made a definite decision that the
employer no longer wishes the job the employee has been
doing done by anyone and this is not due to the ordinary and
customary turnover of labor and that decision may lead to ter-
mination of employment, the employer shall hold discussions
with the employees directly affected and their union.
(ii) The discussions shall take place as soon as practicable after
the employer has made a definite decision . . .
(iii) For the purposes of the discussion the employer shall, as
soon as practicable, provide in writing to the employees con-
cerned and their union, all relevant information about the pro-
posed terminations including the reasons for the proposed
termination, the number and categories of employees likely to
be affected, and the number of workers normally employed and
the period over which the terminations are likely to be carried
out.”
• Severance Pay:
“. . . an employee whose employment is terminated [made redun-
dant] . . . shall be entitled to the following amount of severance pay in
respect of a continuous period of service:
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Period of continuous service Severance pay
1 year or less nil
1 year and less than 2 years 4 weeks’ pay
2 years and less than 3 years 6 weeks’ pay
3 years and less than 4 years 7 weeks’ pay
4 years and over 8 weeks’ pay
*Week’s pay means the ordinary time rate of pay for the
employee concerned.”
Incorporation of these TCR Test Case conditions into awards
seems to have been far from complete.  Pearce, Bartone, and Stephens
(1995, p. 20) reported that in 1990 only 25 percent of federal awards
included provisions from the TCR Test Case.  Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note that the redundancy conditions from the TCR Test Case do
not apply to employees with less than one year’s continuous service,
where an employer can demonstrate incapacity to pay, and in some cir-
cumstances, to employers who employ fewer than 15 workers.  On the
other hand, there are other groups of employees—such as public sector
employees for whom redundancy conditions are specified in special
legislation regulating public sector employment—who would have
much stronger notice provisions than those specified in the TCR Test
Case.
Unemployment benefits
The Australian social security system is primarily a social assis-
tance scheme.  Payments are funded from general taxation revenue and
are based on a person’s current need, rather than on previous levels of
earnings or duration of employment.  Payments are generally available
to all residents of Australia, subject to eligibility and duration of resi-
dency. 
Unemployment benefit payments are available to persons who
have lost or left employment and to persons who are unable to obtain
work on leaving school.  Receipt of benefits is subject to an income test
that allows some nonbenefit earnings before benefits are withdrawn at
a dollar-for-dollar rate.  A waiting period of 13 weeks applies for per-
sons who should be able to support themselves during the initial period
of an unemployment spell (for example, persons who have received
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recreation leave or termination payments from an employer, or who
have considerable financial assets).
There is no limit on the duration of receipt of unemployment bene-
fits provided that an unemployed person is willing and able to under-
take paid employment and is actively seeking work (for example, for
some unemployed persons the “activity test” involves keeping a job-
search diary).
Unemployment benefit replacement rates vary, depending on
whether an unemployed person is single or married, has any children,
and owns or rents housing.  For example, in 1983 the unemployment
benefit for a married person with dependent spouse was $137.30, for
unmarried persons aged 16–17 years without dependents was $40.00,
for unmarried persons aged 18 years and above without dependents
was $68.65, for unmarried persons aged 18 years and above with
dependents was $82.35, and for each child of an unemployed person
with dependents was $10 (Commonwealth Department of Social Secu-
rity 1983).  At the same time, average weekly earnings for a full-time
employee were $172 for a 15- to 19-year-old, $270 for a 20- to 24-
year-old, and $318 for employees as a whole (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 1983).
Table 4.A2 in the appendix presents some more-recent summary
information on replacement rates in Australia compared to average
rates for the OECD.  Three main features are evident.  First, for none of
the cases where an unemployed person would shift to full-time
employment at the average earnings level do unemployment benefits
exceed average earnings.  Second, both in absolute terms and relative
to OECD averages, replacement rates in Australia are higher for cou-
ples with children than couples with no children, and higher for cou-
ples than for single persons.  Third, the longer duration of
unemployment benefits in Australia than in most other countries means
that, whereas replacement rates in Australia are below the OECD aver-
age in the first month of unemployment, this ordering is reversed in the
sixtieth month of unemployment.  It is also important to note that in
Australia persons receiving unemployment benefits are eligible for
other non-cash benefits—in particular, the Health Care card provides
access to reduced-cost medicines and public transport travel.
Displaced workers who shift out of the labor force will also be eli-
gible for social security benefits.  Age pensions are available to males
They Get Knocked Down. Do They Get Up Again? 315
over age 65 and females over 61.  Persons who have a medical condi-
tion which prevents full-time work are eligible for disability support
pensions.  And service pensions are available to male war veterans
over age 60 and female war veterans over age 55.  Each of these pen-
sions is subject to income and assets tests (see Commonwealth Depart-
ment of Social Security 1997).
Wage-setting institutions
There are three main dimensions to the regulatory structure for
wage setting in Australia:
a) Regulation of the wage bargaining process and of the form of
agreement over terms and conditions of employment which can
be made between a worker and employer;
b) Regulation providing for intervention by a third party (industrial
tribunal) in the process of wage bargaining, and in the determi-
nation of terms and conditions of employment; and 
c) Regulation promoting collective organization of workers and
providing a right for collective organizations to represent work-
ers in negotiations over terms and conditions of employment.
Most workers in Australia have minimum terms and conditions
specified in “awards.”  These are written documents which are ratified
and enforced by industrial tribunals at either the state or federal level.
Individual awards generally cover workers within specific occupation
or industry groups.  Each award specifies a range of minimum wage
rates for workers with different skill levels in that occupation or indus-
try group.  Hence a multitude of different minimum wage rates exist in
the economy.  The conditions in an award may be agreed by consent
between a union and employers and then ratified by the relevant indus-
trial tribunal or may be arbitrated by the industrial tribunal.
The principle of “common rule” means that any decision of an
industrial tribunal about conditions in an award will be extended to all
workers in the workforce group covered by that award, regardless of
union status.  Award coverage remained high and relatively constant in
the period from the 1950s to 1990s.  In 1954 the proportion of workers
covered by awards was 90 percent (Dabscheck and Niland 1981, p.
274), and in May 1990, this proportion was 80 percent—33.5 percent
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covered under federal awards, and 46.5 percent under state awards
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1990).  It is important to note, how-
ever, that for a large proportion of these workers minimum wage con-
ditions specified in awards are not binding.  Estimates for 1995 suggest
that about 25 percent of workers had rates of pay at award levels (Aus-
tralian Industrial Relations Commission 1997, p. 124).
Industrial tribunals have an important function in wage determina-
tion in Australia.  These tribunals exist at both the federal and state
level, and may have general coverage (for example, the Federal Indus-
trial Relations Commission) or coverage restricted to specific occupa-
tion groups (such as the Federal Coal Industry Tribunal).  At the
federal level the wage-determination process involves a three-tier sys-
tem:  a) national wage cases where the federal industrial tribunal
adjusts wages for all workers covered by federal awards (often with
flow-ons to workers covered by state awards); b) industry cases where
the federal industrial tribunal is concerned with setting conditions in a
specific award; and c) over-award negotiations or enterprise-level
negotiations which occur directly between employers and employees
and do not involve an industrial tribunal.  Although a greater propor-
tion of workers are covered by state tribunals than federal tribunals,
federal tribunals are generally considered to be more important in the
regulation of wage setting in Australia (see, for example, Dabscheck
and Niland 1981, p. 273).  In particular, wage increases granted to
workers covered by federal awards in national wages cases would usu-
ally flow on to workers covered by state awards.
The importance of industrial tribunals in wage setting—and hence
the degree of centralization in wage bargaining—has varied over time.
In some periods, uniform national wage increases have constituted the
only source of wage increase for workers covered by awards (wage
indexation phases of 1975–1981 and 1983–1985, for example).  At
other times, the most important source of wage increases is from over-
award or enterprise-level negotiations (for example, between 1974 and
1975).
Trade unions have a key role in representing workers in bargaining
over terms and conditions of employment in Australia.  The important
function of unions, and incentives for union organization, have been
effected through legislation which assures access to industrial tribunals
for registered trade unions and which provides exclusive jurisdiction
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over members through the process of registration (Creighton, Ford, and
Mitchell 1993, pp. 923–925).  The main types of unions in Australia
are occupational unions which cover workers performing tasks in a sin-
gle generic category (for example, Federated Clerks Union); partial
industrial unions which draw members from a single industry but do
not have exclusive jurisdiction of that industry (for example, Austra-
lian Railways Union); and general unions which organize workers irre-
spective of occupation or industry classification (for example,
Australian Workers’ Union).
As in a number of other industrial countries, union density has
declined in Australia over the past two decades.  In 1976, 51 percent of
workers were union members; but by 1996 this had declined to 31 per-
cent (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996).  Between 1990 and 1996 a
dramatic decrease in the number of trade unions (from 299 to 132) also
occurred, largely reflecting a process of union amalgamations.
The description of the regulation of wage setting in Australia
applies to most of the period after the 1940s.  Since 1993, however,
there have been a number of important developments in the regulation
of wage bargaining in Australia.  Since these developments have not
had a significant effect on wage outcomes until very recently, they are
not directly relevant for the analysis of the experiences of displaced
workers in Australia that will be undertaken in this chapter.  Neverthe-
less it seems worthwhile to present a brief overview of the main
changes.  The primary recent developments in federal regulation of
wage bargaining in Australia (Commonwealth Department of Indus-
trial Relations 1996) have been to
• Change legislative provisions for wage bargaining so that enter-
prise-level bargaining is the main method for workers to obtain
changes in terms and conditions of employment.
• Reduce the role of the federal industrial tribunal in wage setting,
its main function now being to guard the interests of employees
not able to gain wage increases through enterprise bargaining via
arbitration on general “safety net” wage increases.
• Provide scope for employers to enter formal agreements with
workers without a legal requirement for union involvement in the
wage-bargaining process.
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Summary
A fair degree of similarity appears to exist between institutional
factors in Britain and Australia.  In both countries, levels of employ-
ment protection are relatively low.  The OECD ranks Britain and Aus-
tralia as having respectively the fourth and seventh lowest levels of
employment protection out of 20 OECD countries (see Nickell and
Layard 1999).  The unemployment benefit system in the two countries
are also quite similar.  Benefits are provided for an unlimited period,
but subject to a job-search activity test (which has been progressively
tightened in each country from the 1980s onwards).  Benefit replace-
ment rates in both countries are below the OECD average in the first
month of unemployment for single adults and couples with no children.
They are about the same as the OECD average for couples with chil-
dren.  In the sixtieth month benefit replacement rates in Britain and
Australia are above the OECD average for couples both with and with-
out children.  The main difference between the two countries appears
to be in wage-setting institutions.  Wage setting in Australia—over the
relevant periods for this study—appears to have been more highly reg-
ulated than in Britain.  There has been a more comprehensive system of
minimum wages in Australia, and wage setting has involved a much
greater role for centralized regulatory bodies.  Trends in union density
in the two countries, however, have been quite similar.
What do institutional factors suggest about the experiences of dis-
placed workers in Britain and Australia?  First, the similarity in levels
of employment protection indicates that this should not be a source of
significant differences in rates of worker displacement between Britain
and Australia (although employment protection might be important for
explaining differences between these countries and European countries
with much stricter regulation of worker dismissals).  Second, differ-
ences in wage-setting institutions might be expected to cause differ-
ences in the way in which displaced workers respond to job loss.  In
particular, the system of minimum wages and centralized wage setting
in Australia—compared to Britain—may reduce the chances that dis-
placed workers find new jobs with earnings below those in their predis-
placement jobs.  Hence, differences in wage-setting institutions may
cause adjustment to job loss to occur through non-employment to a
greater degree in Australia than Britain.  By contrast, the unemploy-
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ment benefit system in each country does not seem likely to be a source
of differences in job-search behavior or non-employment durations of
displaced workers in the two.
RESULTS
This section presents findings on the experiences of displaced
workers in Britain and Australia.  The data sources used for the empiri-
cal analysis for each country are described, and some descriptive infor-
mation on the incidence of worker displacement is presented.  The
main parts of the empirical analysis involve an examination of the
earnings and employment  consequences of job loss for displaced
workers.
Several authors have provided evidence from the United States to
the effect that job displacement involves reductions in wages (Hamer-
mesh 1987; Topel 1991; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993;
Stevens 1997; Farber 1993, 1997).  The reasons advanced for this are
loss of firm-specific human capital, loss of good job-match capital, or
loss of wage premiums.  United States evidence also suggests that the
costs of job displacement rise with age, tenure in previous job, and loss
of a union job.  Moreover, earnings appear to fall within the job prior to
displacement.  Earnings do recover after a new job is secured, but not
all these losses are recouped after reentry.  Stevens (1997) suggested
that this occurs largely because of subsequent, repeated job loss. 
 For Britain, Gregg and Wadsworth (1997) have shown that the
wages of jobs taken by those who were out of work have fallen relative
to others in work.  In part this decline is due to higher job-specific
returns, rewards to seniority, and experience at the firm, which cannot
be transferred.  As the wage returns to experience rise within any occu-
pation or skill group, then the job currently held is likely to pay more
than any new job gained after a displacement.  The longer a worker has
been in the job, the greater this penalty will be if some or all of the
returns to accumulated on-the-job experience are lost in the next job.
So the costs of job loss may be higher among older and more experi-
enced workers or wherever job loss is a relatively rare event. 
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Evidence from the United States also suggests that displaced work-
ers experience increases in non-employment and a reduction in hours
of employment following displacement (Swaim and Podgursky 1991;
Ruhm 1991; Farber 1993).  Important determinants of the duration of
non-employment for displaced workers appear to be macroeconomic
conditions prevailing at the time of displacement and factors, such as a
worker’s job tenure and union membership status, which affect the
extent of earnings losses from cross-industry mobility (and hence
determine the scope of a displaced worker’s job search).
Kletzer and Fairlie (1998) found that earnings losses for young dis-
placed workers in the United States are substantial and persistent
(around 10 percent five years following job loss).  Gustafson (1998)
obtained similar results on earnings losses and also found that young
displaced workers have significantly lower employment probabilities
and (for those obtaining jobs) lower hours of work than young labor-
force participants who have not experienced displacement.  This
research suggests that young workers potentially have as much to lose
from displacement as their older counterparts.
Britain
Data
There is no equivalent to the Displaced Workers Survey in Britain
with which to try and investigate the costs of displacement.  Our esti-
mation of the cost of job loss utilizes the information contained within
the labor market histories embedded in the British Household Panel
Survey, a panel survey of around 5,500 households.  The BHPS has
been carried out annually since 1991 and currently runs for six waves.
Information on labor market status for around 8,000 working age indi-
viduals—together with gross monthly pay, hours, and other job charac-
teristics, if in work—is recorded between September and December of
each year.  Details of any changes in labor market status from the Sep-
tember of the previous year until the interview date are recorded in a
series of job history spell data.3  Data on monthly earnings in each spell
are also recorded, and respondents are asked why they left their previ-
ous employment.
Our basic strategy is to compare earnings data in the current job
with earnings in the previous job, with or without an intervening spell
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out of employment.  The principal earnings information in the BHPS is
the individual’s usual gross monthly pay in the job.  Because hours of
work are only asked at the date of interview and not in the job history
data, we are unable to calculate hourly earnings.  There is information
on whether each job is full- or part-time and we use this wherever pos-
sible.  We exclude those who report very low earnings, below £5 a
week.  At these earnings, if true, most recipients will be transitory labor
market participants.  Earnings are deflated by the Retail Price Index
into September 1995 prices.  Students in full-time education and indi-
viduals on maternity leave are removed from the sample, as are those
under the age of 18 and those over pensionable age.  Missing data on
several variables, notably previous job tenure, reduce the final sample
to 25,442 person years, of which 791 are displaced workers with
weekly wage information before and after displacement. 
We focus on the earnings changes of four groups: 1) workers
reporting no change in employer over the year (stayers);4 2) workers
who lost a job either through redundancy or dismissal (displaced); 3)
workers who came to the end of a temporary contract (temporary); and
4) workers who left their last job for other reasons, such as for family
or health or retirement  (leavers).  The sum of the displacement, tempo-
rary, and leaver rates gives the total separation rate.  We also distin-
guish between those who found a job without an intervening spell of
joblessness and those who did not. 
The British institutional system often blurs the distinctions among
the four categories.  If employed for less than two years prior to dis-
placement, a worker is not eligible for redundancy pay.  Yet the term
“redundancy” is a commonly accepted phrase used to cover any invol-
untary separation.  Also, unlike in the United States, “getting the sack”
is a common phrase that does not necessarily imply that the dismissal
was justified by the behavior of the individual (for example, poor time
keeping).  Hence for many workers the terms are essentially inter-
changeable.  We do distinguish, however, between workers displaced
from industries where employment is falling and those displaced from
industries where employment is rising, in an attempt to enforce some
exogeneity over the cause of job loss.  Temporary contract holders are
exempt from redundancy rules and so are best looked at separately.
Unlike in continental Europe a temporary contract is not normally a
probationary period prior to starting a permanent job.
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Incidence of displacement
Our first step is to identify the principal characteristics associated
with displacement in Britain.  Table 4.1 outlines average annual sepa-
ration and displacement rates derived from pooling the six years of the
BHPS.  We calculate for each wave how many were in work at Sep-
tember 1 of the previous year, and then count how many were observed
separating from that job within a year.  On average, one in five
employees, some 5 million workers, separated from their jobs over a
year.  Some 4.7 percent of employees lost their jobs each year as the
result of displacement.  Of these, one-third did not experience any job-
lessness (data not shown).  The ending of a temporary contract was
around one-third as common as displacement in the stock of jobs as a
whole, but since only 7 percent of employees were on such contracts,
the separation rate is very high.  Displacement rates are around 1 per-
centage point higher in industries in which net employment falls over
the year.  One in 8 displacements are classified as  sackings by the
respondents but when focusing on those with more than two years of
job tenure this ratio falls to 1 in 12.  The final two rows contrast separa-
tion rates between industries with growing and falling workforces.
Separation rates in the former are higher, because a larger quit rate
dominates the lower displacement rate.
Men are more than twice as likely to be displaced as women, 6.4
percent compared to 2.9 percent (Table 4.2).  The displacement rate for
younger workers, under the age of 25, at 7.3 percent, is nearly twice
that of other age groups.  There is less evidence that education affects
displacement.  The difference between the highest and lowest educa-
tion groups, at around 0.7 percentage points, is not large.  There is
some variation in displacement rates across industries.  Construction
has the highest rate at 13.2 percent and public services the lowest, at
around 1.4.  Displacements in the service sector are less common than
in manufacturing.  The incidence of displacement falls with job tenure.
There is a 7.9 percent chance that a worker in a job for less than 12
months will lose his or her job and a less than 4 percent chance of dis-
placement for a worker in a job for five years or more.  These numbers
are consistent with the findings of Gregg and Wadsworth (1998) for
Britain who used a different data source.  Longer job tenure is not asso-
ciated with a lower likelihood of displacement followed by a spell out
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of employment.  This is a little surprising, since longer tenured workers
should have longer official notification periods with which to try and
find alternative work.
In order to determine the principal characteristics associated with
displacement, holding other observed factors constant, we next con-
sider multinomial logit estimates of the probability that, within a year,
the worker will 1) be displaced, 2) quit his or her job, or 3) come to the
end of a temporary contract.  The default category is the set of job stay-
ers.  Table 4.3 gives the results.  The coefficients are marginal effects
relative to the sample mean probabilities of belonging to each cate-
gory.5  Consistent with Table 4.2, young, single males with less educa-
tion working in a full-time job in a small firm in manufacturing or
construction with job tenure under two years are all more likely to be
displaced from work, though the gender and age differences are statis-
tically significant only for temporary contract terminations.  The last
column of Table 4.3 gives marginal effects from a binary logit estima-
tion of the probability that a displaced worker will find a new job only
after a spell of joblessness.  Here we remove those in temporary con-
tracts from the sample so that the base category is the set of displaced
workers who undertake a job-to-job move.  The estimates are less pre-
cise, but part-time and low-tenured workers appear much more likely
to experience a spell out of work between jobs.
Time out of work
We next examine the duration pattern of joblessness following dis-
placement in more detail.  Table 4.4 takes the sample of workers in a
job in September of the year prior to the survey and compares the like-
lihood of being in work one year later by type of job separation.  The
numbers are annual averages over the six waves.  Around one-half of
all displaced workers are in employment one year after the initial Sep-
tember observation, compared with around two-thirds of all those who
separate from their jobs.  Those displaced workers with no non-
employment spell between jobs are nearly twice as likely to be in work
in the two observation points than displaced workers who are out of
work for some finite length of time.
Kaplan-Meier estimates of monthly survival and hazard rates for
the time taken to return to work, allowing for censoring based on the
Cox likelihood model, are outlined in Table 4.5.  We follow Gu and
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Kuhn (1998) by including any displaced workers with no jobless spell
in the likelihood function with duration set to one month and all other
durations increased by one month.6  Any displaced workers not back in
employment are treated as right censored at the number of months of
the ongoing jobless spell.  The first observation on the hazard is there-
fore the proportion of displaced workers who find a new job without a
spell of joblessness (21.6 percent).  Thereafter the hazard falls with the
duration of joblessness to around 10 percent at month 10. 
The determinants of the probability of displacement and the time
taken to return to work are given in Table 4.6.  The first columns
present Cox proportional hazard estimates of jobless duration includ-
ing job-to-job movers; the second columns exclude job-to-job movers.
Men are both more likely to lose their jobs and are some 10 percent
less likely to return to work.  Long job tenure is associated with a
quicker return to work.  However, as column 2 shows, once job-to-job
moves are excluded, long job tenure is no longer associated with a
longer period of joblessness.
Earnings consequences of job loss
How much do displaced workers lose?  Table 4.7 summarizes the
mean of the difference in weekly log real earnings before and after dis-
placement.  As a comparison we show the annual earnings change
recorded for workers who remain in the same job over the year.
Weekly wages of the average displaced worker are around 10 percent
lower in the new job than in the job lost (row 3).  If the displaced
worker moves from one full-time job to another, the penalty is only
around 4 percent.7  Weekly earnings of those who remain with their
employer rise by around 5 percent over a year.  So displaced workers
not only experience wage losses relative to their previous job but they
also forego general increases in wage levels.  The total pay penalty is
then 14 percent and 10 percent for those working full-time both before
and after displacement.  For those moving directly from one job to
another the wage falls by just 2 percent.  Hence wage falls are mainly
limited to those displaced workers experiencing some time out of
work, and some of the observed fall is due to shorter hours after dis-
placement.  The wage gaps for all exits into non-employment (includ-
ing quits and those leaving temporary jobs) are smaller, which suggests
that displacement does have distinct labor market effects.  Those leav-
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ing temporary jobs or quitting a job and moving directly into a new job
achieve wage gains above those staying with the same employer.
There is considerable variation around these averages.  Compari-
son of earnings changes by individual characteristics are given in Table
4.8.  Part (a) of the table looks at all reemployed workers; part (b)
restricts attention to workers in full-time jobs both before and after sep-
aration.  Women experience weekly wage losses around twice those of
men, but the gap is lower for full-time job changes.  Older workers and
those out of work longer also face higher pay cuts than the average.
The weekly wage loss for those over 50 is around 18 percent.  Educa-
tion is not correlated with the size of earnings loss.  There is little evi-
dence that the pay gap widens with job tenure, beyond one year in the
previous job.  Coming from a declining industry also makes little dif-
ference.  The biggest variations, however, remain where displacement
results in a spell out of work.
We now explore the size of these wage changes, controlling for
observed differences in worker and firm characteristics in Table 4.9.
We present weekly, full-time to full-time moves only and regressions
that control for part-time status, to be as clear as possible about what is
going on.  Displacement that results in time out of work remains
strongly significant, but this increases with longer durations out of
work.  The biggest falls in earnings are associated with those coming
back into smaller firms than the ones they left.  The results do not con-
firm the effect of job tenure on displacement found elsewhere (Kletzer
1998).  Age is a weakly significant determinant of earnings changes
but the point estimates for over 50s are large.  Gender only matters for
weekly wages, reflecting a greater propensity for women to return part-
time after displacement.  Displacement from a declining industry
makes little difference.  This is important as displacement here is per-
haps a little more exogenous to the abilities of the worker.
Table 4.9 also examines whether there are any distinguishing char-
acteristics between displaced and temporary-contract workers that are
associated with lower earnings on return to work.  We present results
for the entire set of displaced and temporary workers with or without a
spell out of work and the subsets who move full-time to full-time.  The
results are not always well determined, but the length of time out is
negatively associated with the change in earnings for displaced work-
ers.  Those out for more than 12 months experience a cost of job loss
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17 percent greater than displaced workers who move immediately to
another job.  For the full-time sample, older workers experience wage
losses around 15 percent above the base group. 
Table 4.10 estimates the cost of job loss for displaced workers rel-
ative to stayers, conditional on the characteristics outlined in Table 4.8.
We present simple OLS estimates of the difference in log wage growth
between job stayers and displaced workers.  Other types of separation
are included as intercept terms.  The raw weekly cost is 16.9 percent if
a spell out of work is observed.  Controlling for worker and firm char-
acteristics makes little difference to these estimates.  Termination of a
temporary contract that results in a spell out of work reduces earnings
growth by only around 2 percent.  Moving to a new job directly after
displacement leads to a loss of earnings in the order of 5 percent.




The empirical analysis in this section draws on two main types of
data.  First, we use aggregate-level evidence on the rate of worker dis-
placement and reemployment probabilities for displaced workers,
which are available for various years between 1975 and 1997.  Second,
we use individual-level data on earnings and employment outcomes of
young workers in Australia that allow displaced workers to be identi-
fied.
The sources for the aggregate-level data are the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) Labor Mobility Survey, a periodic supplement to
the ABS Labor Force Survey; and two special surveys of displaced
workers, also undertaken as supplements to the ABS Labor Force Sur-
vey.  The first of these (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993) focused
on the state of Victoria only; the second (Australian Bureau of Statis-
tics 1997) was Australia-wide.  The displaced worker surveys collected
information on whether a respondent had been displaced from a job in
the previous three-year period; the characteristics of the job from
which the respondent had been displaced; reason for displacement;
respondent’s labor-force status at the survey date; and the respondent’s
personal characteristics.
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The data source for detailed analysis of displaced workers in Aus-
tralia is the Youth in Transition Survey (YTS).  This is a series of lon-
gitudinal surveys conducted by the Australian Council for Educational
Research.  Surveys of cohorts born in 1961, 1965, 1970, and 1975 have
been undertaken.8  Individuals in each cohort were initially sampled in
their mid teens (for example, the 1961 cohort were initially sampled as
14-year-olds), and then in each subsequent year through to 1995.9  In
the initial survey for each cohort a range of background information
was collected relating, for example, to country of birth, parents’ educa-
tional attainment, and mathematics aptitude.  In each subsequent
annual survey two main types of information relevant to this study
were collected.  First, respondents completed a diary showing educa-
tional and labor-force status in each month throughout the preceding
year.  Second, respondents provided information on details of labor-
force status, earnings, hours and weeks worked, and occupation in the
survey month (October).
A sample of displaced workers was extracted from the YTS by
defining displacement to occur where being “laid off” was a “very
important” or “fairly important” reason for losing their last job.  Infor-
mation on reason for job loss in the preceding year is available for per-
sons in the 1961 cohort for 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1993, and in the
1965 cohort for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1993.  Information on the con-
struction of other variables is presented in the appendix.
Data from the YTS has a number of shortcomings for analyzing
experiences of displaced workers.  The primary one is that the sample
is likely to display length sampling bias.  That is, since the sample of
displaced workers is drawn from a subset of respondents who were
unemployed at the survey date (only those persons were asked ques-
tions about reasons for job loss), displaced workers who have relatively
long spells of unemployment will tend to be overrepresented, and those
with short spells of unemployment will tend to be underrepresented.
To attempt to overcome this problem, each observation is weighted by
the inverse of the duration of the completed non-employment spell.
The rationale for making this correction is that, in a steady state, the
probability of sampling a spell at any instant of time is proportional to
its completed length.  Hence, by weighting each observation by the
inverse of its length, the entire density function for completed new
spell durations is obtained.10  For an incomplete spell, a completed
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spell duration is estimated as the weighted average of all completed
spells lasting longer than that incomplete spell.  The weights are used
in all subsequent analyses of the sample of displaced workers.11
One aspect of the length bias problem which cannot be addressed
is that—since a displaced worker must be unemployed to be observed
as displaced—there is no information on displaced workers who had an
immediate transition to employment following displacement.  For this
reason the results should be interpreted as conditional on experiencing
some joblessness.  Two other shortcomings should also be noted.  First,
since a question on reason for job loss was asked only in four years for
each cohort, the sample of displaced workers which can be obtained is
quite small.  Second, the sample of displaced workers from the YTS is
unrepresentative of the general population of displaced workers in that
it is restricted to a group of relatively young workers who were dis-
placed at trough points in the Australian labor market.12 For example,
Farber (1993) found that the difference in employment outcomes
between displaced and nondisplaced workers is greater during reces-
sions than expansions.
Incidence of displacement
Time-series information on annual rates of job separation from the
ABS Labor Mobility Survey—together with the rate of unemploy-
ment—are displayed in Table 4.11.  “Rate of job separation—displace-
ments” can be interpreted as the rate of worker displacement.  This is
equal to the number of workers who ceased a job during the year
whose reason for ceasing that job was being laid off or a business clo-
sure divided by the total number of persons who held a job during the
year.  Other rate-of-separation measures are similarly defined.13  It is
evident that the annual rate of aggregate job separation is about 25 per-
cent.  The annual rate of job separation due to displacement is about 5
percent; and the rate due to job loss is about 9 percent.  The aggregate
rate of job separation is inversely correlated with the rate of unemploy-
ment.  Job separation rates due to displacement and job loss display a
positive correlation with the rate of unemployment.  Over the period
between 1975 and 1997, the aggregate rate of job separation displays a
slight downward trend.  The rate of job separation due to displacements
does not show any particular trend.
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Average displacement rates for workers in disaggregated gender
and tenure categories can also be calculated using information from the
ABS Labor Mobility Survey.14  Table 4.12 shows the average rate of
displacement in Australia from 1983 to 1997.  A number of findings
emerge.  First, displacement declines with years of tenure of an
employee (in particular for employees with up to five years of tenure);
second, the rate of displacement is generally higher for male than
female workers; and third, the amount of cyclical variation in the rate
of displacement is largest (in absolute terms) for workers with low ten-
ure.
Other evidence on the incidence of worker displacement is avail-
able from the population surveys of displaced workers undertaken in
Victoria in 1993, and for Australia in 1997.  The main findings from
the surveys—summarized in Table 4.13—are that
• Between October 1990 and 1993 about 10 percent of workers in
Victoria were displaced from a job.  Between July 1994 and 1997
about 7 percent of workers in Australia were  displaced.
• Rates of displacement are higher for male than female workers,
but they do not display a strong correlation with age.
Farber (1997, p. 121) reported that the proportion of persons in the
United States displaced from employment between 1991 and 1993 was
12.8 percent, and between 1993 and 1995 was 15.1 percent.  Over the
period from 1981 to 1995 in the United States the three-year displace-
ment rates for various subperiods were found to range from 9.0 to 15.1
percent.  Hence it appears that the three-year job displacement rate
found from the Australian displacement survey is quite similar to rates
found for the United States.
Time out of work
Aggregate-level information on labor market outcomes for dis-
placed workers is available from the ABS surveys of retrenched work-
ers.  This information—on the labor-force status at the survey date of
workers displaced in the previous three years—is also presented in
Table 4.13.  It shows that
• In October 1993 the rate of employment of persons in Victoria
who had been displaced in the previous three-year period was
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50.8 percent; and in July 1997 the rate of employment of persons
displaced in Australia in the previous three years was 54.7 per-
cent.
• The probability of reemployment among displaced workers was
lowest for persons in older age groups (50+ years), whose last job
was in a blue-collar occupation, and who were from a NESB
country.  It is higher for men than women, and lower for persons
without postschool qualifications than for those with postschool
qualifications.
Information on the employment status of displaced workers from
the ABS retrenched worker surveys appears comparable to information
presented by Ruhm (1998, Table 4) on the labor-force status at Febru-
ary 1996 of workers displaced in the United States between 1993 and
1995.  Ruhm found that 71.6 percent of displaced workers were in
employment at the survey date.  This is considerably higher than the
employment ratios for displaced workers of around 50 to 55 percent
found from the Australian surveys.  It suggests the possibility that
employment costs of displacement are higher in Australia than the
United States.  However, it is also necessary to take into account that
the labor market in the United States was much stronger than in Aus-
tralia during this period of the mid 1990s, so that at least part of the dif-
ference in employment outcomes for displaced workers may be
explained by cyclical factors.
Tables 4.14 to 4.17 present information on labor-force outcomes
for young displaced workers using individual-level data from the YTS.
These tables are based on a sample of persons unemployed at the sur-
vey dates who are classified as displaced workers.  In the calculations
for each table the weighting method (using the inverse of completed
duration of the spell of non-employment) described above has been
applied.
Table 4.14 presents information on the labor-force status of the
sample of displaced workers at 6 and 12 months after the date of dis-
placement.  First, it is clear that a substantial proportion of displaced
workers remain unemployed and out of the labor force in the year after
displacement.  Second, there is no significant change in the non-
employment probability of displaced workers between 6 and 12
months.  What does happen, however, is that the composition of
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employment for displaced workers in employment shifts to some
degree from part-time to full-time jobs.  Third, some effect of educa-
tional attainment is apparent—in particular, having completed high
school or having a postschool qualification is associated with a higher
probability of full-time employment for female displaced workers.
An alternative aspect of labor-force transitions for displaced work-
ers is to examine the duration of spells of non-employment which fol-
low displacement.  The Kaplan-Meier hazard results for exit from non-
employment and survival function in non-employment for displaced
workers are presented in Table 4.15.  Over the 12 months following
displacement the hazard rate displays a downward trend; however,
there is a relatively large degree of month-to-month volatility.  
To further explore the process of transition to reemployment,
regression analysis of the determinants of the time to exit from non-
employment for displaced workers has been undertaken.  The analysis
involves estimation of a weighted probit regression where the depen-
dent variable is a monthly observation of whether a displaced worker
exited from non-employment in that month, conditional on not having
exited previously.  Explanatory variables included are age at time of
displacement, reading and mathematical aptitude test scores (with
interactions with a dummy variable for the 1961 cohort to allow for
differences in the tests between cohorts), rate of unemployment in last
occupation, and dummy variables for gender, year, country of birth,
and whether a respondent completed high school or had a postschool
qualification.
The main results from the regression analysis of determinants of
exit from non-employment are shown in Table 4.16.  A first main find-
ing is that—consistent with the Kaplan-Meier hazard function—the
probability of reemployment declines with spell duration.  For each
extra month of non-employment the probability of exit from non-
employment declines by about 1 percent (evaluated at the mean value
of other explanatory variables).  Alternative specifications of the spell-
duration variable (quadratic and cubic specifications) were also tested;
however, F-tests could not reject the hypothesis that the extra explana-
tory terms were insignificant.  The second finding is that a range of
other explanatory variables—age, whether completed high school or
have a postschool qualification, gender, and rate of unemployment in
last occupation—are found to affect the probability of exit from non-
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employment.  Age is inversely related to the probability of reemploy-
ment, suggesting that older displaced workers (more than 30 years old)
find it relatively more difficult to find a new job.  One explanation for
this finding may be that rates of job turnover are higher for workers
aged 15–24 years than for those 25–34 years, so that the flow of job
vacancies may also be higher for the younger group of workers (Bor-
land and Kennedy 1998).  However, it is important to note that—due to
collinearity between the age and year variables—age is only significant
in specifications without year dummy variables.  Hence the age vari-
able may be proxying for year effects.  Males who are displaced have a
higher probability of reemployment than do female displaced workers,
and displaced workers in occupations with relatively high rates of
unemployment have a relatively lower probability of reemployment.
Finally, it appears that high-skill workers—who have completed high
school or have a postschool qualification and have higher levels of
aptitude in reading—have higher exit probabilities from non-employ-
ment than low-skill workers.  Other explanatory variables, such as
reading and math aptitude, are not found to affect the probability of
exit from non-employment.
An alternative perspective on the labor-force experience of dis-
placed workers is to examine average hours and weeks of work in the
period following displacement.  Table 4.17 shows the weighted aver-
age ratio of weeks and hours of work in the quarter preceding displace-
ment to weeks and hours of work in each of the first eight quarters after
displacement.  Displaced workers are found on average to have worse
employment outcomes in every quarter in the two years following dis-
placement than in the quarter preceding displacement.  This difference
is generally statistically significant for the first six to seven quarters
following displacement.
Findings from the YTS therefore suggest that the costs to displaced
workers from time out of employment may be quite substantial.  How-
ever, in interpreting results on employment outcomes for displaced
workers from the YTS, a number of factors must be taken into account.
First, since the sample of displaced workers excludes those who moved
immediately to a new job, the adverse employment consequences of
displacement may be overestimated.  Second, labor-force mobility
(transitions into and out of employment, for example) is higher for
younger than older labor-force participants so that the apparent employ-
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ment consequences of displacement may be in some part due to the age
of the sample of workers.
Earnings consequences of job loss
The other main cost of job loss occurs through changes in earnings
following displacement.  To address this issue in the YTS, data on
weekly earnings for both displaced and nondisplaced workers can be
taken from the years prior to and following each sample year in which
information on reason for job loss is available.  For displaced workers,
weekly earnings in the predisplacement job are observed for the sam-
ple of workers who were in their predisplacement job 12 months prior
to the time of the survey question on displacement (that is, in the pre-
ceding October).  Hence this information on earnings ranges from 1 to
11 months prior to displacement.  Weekly earnings in postdisplace-
ment jobs are observed for the samples of workers in employment 12,
24, and 36 months following the time of the survey question on dis-
placement (that is, in October in subsequent years).  For nondisplaced
workers, weekly earnings data that will match with data for displaced
workers is obtained by using the same set of years around those sample
years in which information on reason for job loss is available.  All dis-
placed and nondisplaced workers with observations on weekly earn-
ings are included in the respective samples.
As an example, for the 1961 cohort, information on reason for job
loss is available in 1981.  Hence, information on weekly earnings is
obtained (if available) for 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1984 for all workers
who were displaced and nondisplaced in October 1981.  This means
that the sample of nondisplaced workers may include some workers
who experienced job loss during this period but did not have the status
of a displaced worker in October 1981; and it will also include volun-
tary job switchers.  Unfortunately the data set does not allow these sep-
arate types of workers to be identified.
Weekly earnings in different years are adjusted to constant dollars,
using the Consumer Price Index.  Note that since the information is on
weekly earnings it may reflect changes in weekly hours of work as well
as hourly wage rates.  Information on hours of work is not available for
a sufficient number of observations to allow the analysis to be under-
taken using hourly wage rates. 
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A factor to take into account in interpreting findings on the effect
of job loss on earnings is the potential role of selection effects.  One
aspect of selection effects is that to the extent that displaced workers
who obtain reemployment are not representative of all displaced work-
ers—and, as seems likely, are of higher ability than average—the
change in weekly earnings may be an overestimate of the change for all
displaced workers.
Table 4.18 shows the weighted average difference between log real
weekly earnings in displaced workers’ jobs 1–2, 2–3, and 3–4 years
after displacement and log real weekly earnings in the predisplacement
job, and data on average changes in log real weekly earnings for non-
displaced workers taken from the same time periods as for displaced
workers.  It is evident that both displaced and nondisplaced workers
experience growth in weekly earnings over time.  Some differences,
however, do emerge in comparing earnings changes over time.  Focus-
ing on the sample of full-time workers (in order to minimize composi-
tion effects) it appears that the difference in earnings outcomes
between displaced and nondisplaced workers tends to increase over
time.  In the period 1–2 years after displacement there is no significant
difference in the change in log weekly earnings for displaced and non-
displaced workers.  In the period 2–3 years after displacement, earn-
ings of nondisplaced workers are about 7 percent higher than for
displaced workers, and by 3–4 years this difference has become 16 per-
cent.  (These latter findings, however, are based on a very small num-
ber of observations for displaced workers.)
To conclude the analysis of earnings outcomes for displaced work-
ers, a regression analysis of the determinants of earnings and changes
in earnings was undertaken using data on real weekly earnings predis-
placement and 1–2 years postdisplacement.  The effect of displacement
is examined by including as an explanatory variable a dummy variable
for whether a worker was classified as displaced at the relevant survey
date.
The findings are presented in Table 4.19.  Log weekly earnings in
pre- and postdisplacement years are significantly lower for females
than males, are decreasing with the rates of unemployment in a
worker’s occupation category, higher for full-time than part-time
workers, and follow a quadratic pattern with age.  Displaced workers
have lower weekly earnings than nondisplaced workers although the
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effect is only statistically significant for postdisplacement earnings
where year dummies are included as explanatory variables.  The
change in log weekly earnings is significantly negatively related to age
(reflecting a decreasing rate of increase in earnings), and is signifi-
cantly affected by switching between part-time and full-time employ-
ment.  The effect of displacement on the change in log real weekly
earnings is not statistically significant.  Hence these findings provide
some limited evidence that displaced workers have a lower level of
earnings than nondisplaced workers, but little evidence of short-term
earnings losses due to job loss.
Summary
Analysis of the experiences of Australian displaced workers sug-
gests two main findings.  First, these workers experience substantial
periods of non-employment following displacement.  Second, for
younger displaced workers there do not appear to be significant short-
term earnings consequences from displacement.15  One possible expla-
nation for these findings is the nature of labor market institutions in
Australia.  The absence of a wage adjustment for displaced workers —
or more generally in response to adverse demand conditions—would
suggest that adjustment should then take place through employment.
This appears to be consistent with our findings on employment out-
comes for displaced workers.  It is also worth noting that other case-
study evidence on displaced workers has generally found little effect
on earnings of displaced workers who are reemployed but significant
effects on employment outcomes for displaced workers (see Borland
1998).
As has been noted earlier, it is also necessary, however, to recog-
nize how selection effects might have affected the findings.  First, the
sample of displaced workers excludes those workers who shifted to a
new job without an intervening period of non-employment.  Second,
the sample of displaced workers in new jobs—from whom earnings
information is obtained—may be of greater average ability than the
entire group of displaced workers.  Hence, estimates of the employ-
ment and wage costs of job loss for Australia derived in this chapter are
likely,  respectively, to over- and underestimate the true consequences.
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CONCLUSIONS
Every year around 5 to 6 percent of workers in Britain and Austra-
lia will lose their jobs as a result of layoff, plant closure, or the end of a
contract.  Job loss is most likely to occur within the first year of any
job.  Most displaced workers will return to work within a year, though
a significant proportion do not. 
In Britain, the median length of joblessness is around three months.
Displaced workers will enter jobs that pay weekly wages, on average,
around 10 percentage points less than those they left behind.  Com-
pared with those who remain continuously in the same post, the wage
gap is around 15 percent.  However, much larger penalties are experi-
enced by displaced workers with longer seniority, and those out of
work for 12 months or more.
In Australia, for the sample of young displaced workers examined,
job loss has significant consequences for future employment.  A large
proportion of displaced workers remain out of work for some period
following displacement, and average hours of work per quarter postdis-
placement remain below average hours of work in the quarter preced-
ing displacement for the two years after job loss.  By contrast, for the
sample of young workers examined, there do not appear to be signifi-
cant short-term consequences for labor market earnings due to job loss.
What do these findings suggest about the role of institutional fac-
tors in determining experiences of displaced workers?  Differences
between the data sources make it very difficult to provide any defini-
tive answers to this question.  One point to emerge is that rates of sepa-
ration and worker displacement do appear quite similar in Britain and
Australia for the 1990s.  In both countries the average rate of separa-
tion is about 20 percent; and the average rate of worker displacement
around 5 percent.  Hence displacements constitute about 25 to 30 per-
cent of total separations. 
It is more difficult to make comparisons of the process of adjust-
ment to job loss for displaced workers in Britain and Australia.  The
case of Australia—with its highly regulated system of wage setting
where there have been relatively large costs to displaced workers in the
form of time out of employment but little apparent effect on earnings
from job loss—does seem consistent with the hypothesis that where
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institutional factors prevent wage adjustment to an adverse demand
shock there will be greater employment adjustment.  However, it is
also necessary to note that for Britain there is no evidence of large
earnings losses for young displaced workers.  This suggests that it
would be necessary to exercise caution before attributing the absence
of earnings losses in Australia to the effects of wage-setting institutions
rather than to age-specific determinants of the adjustment process.
Notes
We are grateful for many helpful comments from Jaap Abbring and Peter Kuhn.  LFS
and BHPS data for Britain are supplied by the ESRC Data Archive at Essex University
with permission of OPCS.  YTS data for Australia are supplied by the Australian
Council of Education Research.
1. Specifically, men’s employment rate fell from 74.4 percent in 1978 to 67.4 per-
cent in 1995; women’s increased from 40.5 to 49.7 percent over the same period.
Trends in labor-force participation rates were very similar.
2. The government explicitly recognized this problem in its 1998 budget, raising the
zero contribution threshold by one-third and imposing a flat NIC rate of 12.5 per-
cent on all earnings above this threshold.  This change came too late for the period
covered by our data.
3. Attempts to match the current spell in the last wave to a particular spell in the job
history data in the following wave proved fraught with errors.  The September
data across the waves matches better.  This is because the September first infor-
mation is requested in every wave.  The spell histories then count forward from
this point until the date of interview and backward to September first of the previ-
ous year.  Matching the current job from the previous wave is hampered both
because the interview date floats between September and April of the following
year and because of resulting recall error in dating events between last September
and the previous interview data.  See Halpin (1997) or Paull (1997) on problems
in spell data and recall error across waves in the BHPS.
4. “Stayers” includes individuals promoted within a firm to a new job title.
5. The marginal effect of variable xi on the probability of being in category j, Pj is
given by dPj/dxi = Pj[bj – Σk Pk bk] where bj is the coefficient on variable i in cate-
gory j.  The sample means of the stayer, quit, temporary, and displaced categories
are 0.78, 0.14, 0.03, and 0.03.
6. Gu and Kuhn (1998) pointed out that the Cox likelihood function depends only on
the ranking of the durations and therefore is invariant to the addition of a scalar.
This allows the inclusion of the zero duration job-to-job displaced in the likeli-
hood, unlike other parametric models.
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7. These numbers are similar to the findings of Gregory and Jukes (1997) for unem-
ployed men.  There is only a very small hourly wage penalty, on average, to being
displaced but this is mainly a selection effect, as the monthly wage gap is much
smaller for those where hourly wages are defined.  t-Tests on the equality of the
means of the stayer and displaced groups confirm that the weekly and hourly
mean pay changes are significantly different in the two groups.
8. Further details on the Youth in Transition survey are available from Marks (vari-
ous years) and from http://www.acer.edu.au/lsay/longitud.htm.
9. The only exception is that a survey for the 1961 cohort was not undertaken in
1985 or 1988 due to resource constraints.
10. Let f(d) be the density of completed new spell durations, and g(d) be the density
of completed durations of spells observed at any point in time.  In a steady state:
f(d) = k(g(d)/d) where k is a constant.  Because f(d) must integrate to one, there-
fore k is equal to the integral over d of g(d)/d.  Hence, weighting each observation
by the inverse of its length gives the density for all new completed spell durations.
11 An alternative approach would be to use maximum likelihood techniques to
jointly address the length-sampling bias and censoring issues.
12. Cyclical peaks in the rate of unemployment occurred in quarter 2 of 1983 and
quarter 3 of 1993.
13. “Rate of job separation - aggregate” is equal to the number of workers who ceased
a job during the year divided by the total number of persons who had a job during
the year; and “Rate of job separations - job losers” is equal to the number of work-
ers who ceased a job during the calendar year whose reason for ceasing that last
job was retrenchment or ill health, seasonal or temporary job divided by the total
number of persons who had a job during the year.
14. Average rates of job separation - displacement for employees in disaggregated
tenure (or gender) categories are calculated as
Prob(Dit = 1|Tit = j) = [Prob(Tit = j|Dit = 1) x Prob(Dit = 1)] / [Prob(Tit = j)]
where Prob(Dit = 1|Tit = j) is the probability that an employee is displaced in time
period t given that the employee is in tenure (or gender) category j; Prob(Tit = j|Dit
= 1) is the probability than an employee is in tenure (or gender) category j given
that the employee has been displaced in time period t; and Prob(Dit = 1) and
Prob(Tit = j) are, respectively, the probabilities than an employee is displaced and
that an employee is in tenure (or gender) category j in time period t (Farber 1993,
p. 89).
15. These findings seem consistent with Gray (1999), who finds—using a different
longitudinal data set covering young workers in Australia in the early 1990s—that
in general unemployment experience does not have a strong effect on future
hourly wages, but does have a significant influence on future hours of work.
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Total Redundant Sack Quit Total Redundant Sack
All industries 20.9 11.9 0.7 9.8 1.6 1.4 0.2 9.0 0.9 5.0 3.1 2.7 0.4 4.7
Declining
industry
19.4 10.9 0.7 9.8 1.6 1.4 0.2 8.2 0.7 4.0 3.5 3.2 0.3 5.1
Growing
industry
22.8 12.9 0.7 9.8 1.5 1.3 0.2 9.9 1.0 6.1 2.8 2.3 0.5 4.3
Tenure in 
previous  jobs ≥2
All industries 15.9 8.7 0.4 7.1 1.2 1.1 0.1 7.1 0.3 4.3 2.5 2.3 0.2 4.0
Declining
industry
14.8 8.2 0.4 6.5 1.3 1.2 0.1 6.5 0.2 3.4 2.9 2.7 0.2 4.5
Growing
industry
17.0 9.2 0.3 7.8 1.1 1.0 0.1 7.7 0.4 5.2 2.1 1.9 0.2 3.5
SOURCE: BHPS.








% job to job in 
displacements
Gender
Female 18.6 2.9 1.0 1.9 35.0
Male 23.1 6.4 2.1 4.3 32.7
Age (yr.)
Youths  <25 35.9 7.3 2.1 5.1 29.8
Prime 25–49 18.9 4.3 1.6 2.7 37.6
Mature 50+ 16.9 4.4 1.1 3.3 23.9
Marital status
Single 26.1 5.8 1.8 4.0 30.6
Married 18.8 4.4 1.5 2.8 34.7
Qualifications
None 19.0 5.5 1.4 4.1 26.0
Lower Intermed. 21.8 4.8 1.7 3.1 35.6
Upper Intermed. 19.2 2.6 1.1 1.5 41.2
Degree 20.6 6.2 2.0 4.2 31.9
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Job tenure (yr.)
<1 35.9 7.9 2.8 5.1 36.0
≥1 – <2 23.8 5.3 1.7 3.6 31.5
≥2 – <5 16.7 3.7 1.1 2.6 30.9
≥5 – <10 13.1 3.3 1.2 2.1 37.2
10+ 13.6 3.5 1.0 2.5 28.5
Industry
Agriculture/energy 18.3 5.4 2.0 3.3 38.0
Manufacturing 21.9 7.8 2.1 5.6 27.6
Construction 36.9 13.2 5.0 8.2 37.7
Distribution 24.4 5.0 1.9 3.1 37.4
Transport 18.7 4.7 1.7 3.0 36.5
Banking 22.8 4.8 2.0 2.8 42.1
Private services 23.9 2.5 1.2 1.2 50.0
Public  services 14.6 1.4 0.4 1.0 27.7
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Table 4.3 Who Is Displaced?  Multinomial Logit and Binary Logit 
Estimates for Britain
Multinomial logit Binary logit
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Multinomial logit Binary logit




































































































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Coefficients in logits are marginal effects
and their standard errors relative to sample mean of each category.  Equations also
include controls for region and year.  ** = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from BHPS data.
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Table 4.4 Labor-Force Status One Year Later in Britain 
(annual averages)
Table 4.5 Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Hazard and Survival Rate of 
Return to Work in Britain 
Group Self-employed Employed Unemployed Inactive
All separations 6.3 65.3 15.9 12.5
All displaced 7.0 53.6 34.9 4.5
Job to job 13.4 79.5 5.2 1.9
Exit 3.8 40.5 49.9 5.8
All not displaced
Job to job 7.8 88.6 2.8 0.8
Temporary job 8.6 84.3 6.6 0.5
Not temporary job 7.8 88.9 2.5 0.8
Exit 2.9 33.6 23.6 39.8
Temporary job 4.7 47.0 35.6 12.7
Not temporary job 2.6 31.3 21.5 44.6
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from BHPS data.
Time out after displacement 












NOTE: Job-to-job moves all measured as ending spell at month 0.  Initial sample =
853, of which 313 are job-to-job, 475 displaced, and 75 right-censored.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.6 Cox Estimates of Time to Return to Work for Displaced 
Workers  in Britain
































Age ≥ 50 yr. 0.367** 
(0.128)
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Table 4.6 (continued)











































































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Additional coefficients in Cox are mea-
sured relative to baseline hazard.  Equations also include controls for region and year.
** = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.7 Mean Log Weekly Wage Growth by Labor Market Status 
in Britain
Labor market status Mean changea Full time – full timeb
































Exit and quit (990)









a Sample size in parentheses.
b Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.8a Mean Weekly Wage Growth by Labor Market 













Women 4.9 –15.9 –4.3 –24.7 –0.1 –6.4
Men 4.2 –6.2 0.4 –9.7 3.8 –4.0
Age (yr.)
Youths (< 25) 10.7 –5.2 1.8 –7.9 4.3 –3.4
Prime (25–49) 4.4 –9.6 0.0 –16.1 0.9 –2.9
Mature (50+) 1.3 –18.0 –15.1 –19.8 –6.4 –20.9
Time out
<6 months n.a.a –11.8 n.a. –11.8 –1.9 –12.4
6+ months n.a. –15.6 n.a. –15.6 –5.2 –24.0
Education
None 2.6 –10.2 –0.5 –16.4 –8.8 –7.5
0  level and 
equiv.
5.0 –10.0 –2.3 –14.5 1.2 –4.0
A level/degree 4.5 –8.6 –0.2 –13.8 7.4 –8.1
Job tenure (yr.)
<1 6.1 –13.3 –3.9 –16.4 0.8 –3.7
≥1 – <2 6.4 –7.7 –4.0 –9.8 3.6 0.4
≥2 – <5 5.1 –6.5 3.5 –14.1 6.4 –5.8




5.1 –8.2 0.9 –14.3 2.7 –4.0
Declining ind. 3.9 –10.7 –3.4 –14.7 –0.2 –6.3
a n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations.
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Women 7.0 –5.6 0.4 –12.3 10.1 2.5
Men 4.6 –3.9 1.2 –6.8 7.4 0.3
Age
Youths (<25) 11.7 3.2 7.0 1.7 14.8 4.4
Prime (25–49) 5.2 –5.6 0.8 –10.7 6.5 2.3
Mature (50+) 2.7 –11.5 –7.1 –14.6 –0.7 –11.0
Time out
<6 months n.a.a –7.3 n.a. –7.3 7.8 –0.4
6+ months       n.a. –8.4        n.a. –8.4 5.8 –15.3
Education
None 3.3 –2.3 7.5 –10.4 –5.8 –2.1
0 level and
equiv.
6.1 –6.7 –2.0 –9.9 10.0 1.1
A level/degree 5.4 0.5 3.4 –1.6 13.2 2.3
Job tenure (yr.)
<1 7.6 –5.7 –3.1 –6.8 9.1 3.7
≥1 – <2 6.9 0.5 –0.3 1.0 14.2 4.2
≥2 – <5 6.1 –5.2 5.2 –14.3 4.9 –1.4
5+ 3.5 –6.5 0.5 –17.5 3.6 0.6
Industry
Expanding ind. 6.5 –2.6 3.0 –7.2 10.1 3.0
Declining ind. 4.7 –5.6 –0.8 –8.6 6.9 –0.2
a n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.9 OLS Log Wage-Growth Regressions for Separating Groups 
in Britain
Displaced Temporary contract














































































































Part-time then  0.519**
(0.147)








R2 0.150 0.027 0.131 0.025
N 791 688 485 398
NOTE: White adjusted standard errors in parentheses.  ** = Statistically significant at
the 5% level.
a FT = Full-time.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.10 OLS Log Wage-Change Estimates for Britain






















































































Sample size 25,276 25,276 22,424 22,424
R2 0.023 0.101 0.026 0.036
NOTE: White adjusted standard errors in parentheses.  A dash (–) means the variable
was not included.  ** = Statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically signif-
icant at the 10% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Displaced Job losers Aggregate
1975 4.6 5.9 9.8 24.9
1976 4.7 n.d.a n.d. n.d.
1977 5.7 n.d. n.d. n.d.
1978 6.2 5.7 9.5 24.8
1979 5.9 5.1 8.5 23.0
1980 5.9 n.d. n.d. n.d.
1981 5.6 4.4 6.2 25.0
1982 6.7 7.2 10.2 24.8
1983 9.9 5.6 8.4 22.4
1984 8.5 4.7 8.0 23.3
1985 7.9 4.1 7.6 24.6
1986 8.0 4.6 8.8 24.5
1987 7.8 4.4 9.0 25.4
1988 6.8 4.1 7.6 26.2
1989 5.7 4.4 9.3 25.5
1990 7.0 6.5 10.1 23.2
1991 9.5 6.4 10.1 21.4
1992 10.5 n.d. n.d. n.d.
1993 10.7 5.4 9.3 22.2
1994 9.2 n.d. n.d. n.d.
1995 8.1 4.6 8.7 23.0
1996 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1997 8.4 4.4 7.6 21.4
a n.d. = No data available.
SOURCE: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labor Mobility Survey, various years.
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Table 4.12 Average Rate of Job Displacement in Australia from 1983 to 1997
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Gender
Male 0.059 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.073 0.060 0.052 0.048
Female 0.050 0.038 0.041 0.043 0.052 0.043 0.039 0.038
Tenure (yr.)
<1 0.136 0.096 0.097 0.095 0.131 0.104 0.098 0.096
≥1 – <3 0.051 0.036 0.042 0.044 0.084 0.062 0.045 0.046
≥3 – <5 0.040 0.022 0.030 0.023 0.045 0.044 0.028 0.031
≥5 – <10 0.023 0.016 0.019 0.017 0.028 0.027 0.024 0.026
10+ 0.020 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.029 0.024 0.020 0.020
SOURCE: Australian Bureau of Statistics, various years, Catalogue no. 6209.0.
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Table 4.13 Incidence of Displacement and Reemployment of Displaced 



















Univ. degree + — 0.584
Trade qualification — 0.648
Completed H.S. — 0.490
Not completed H.S. — 0.358
Country of birth
Australia 0.528
Immigrant – ESBa — 0.581
Immigrant – NESBb — 0.418
Tenure (yr.)
<1 — 0.430
≥1 – <3 — 0.595
≥3 – <5 — 0.581

































≥1 – <3 — 0.606
≥3 – <5 — 0.634






Plant and machine operators, 
laborers, etc.
— 0.452
a ESB = English-speaking background.
b NESB = Non-English-speaking background.
SOURCE: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993, 1997.










Six months after displacement
Aggregate
Male 0.44 0.18 0.26 0.12 198
Female 0.36 0.21 0.31 0.12 178
Educational attainment
Male
NCHS 0.43 0.15 0.30 0.12 104
CHS/postschool qualif. 0.46 0.21 0.22 0.11 94
Female
NCHS 0.27 0.25 0.35 0.13 73
CHS/postschool qualif. 0.42 0.19 0.29 0.10 105
Twelve months after displacement
Aggregate
Male 0.51 0.10 0.22 0.17 179




NCHS 0.48 0.13 0.21 0.18 88
CHS/postschool qualif. 0.54 0.07 0.22 0.17 91
Female
NCHS 0.28 0.08 0.38 0.24 60
CHS/postschool qualif. 0.52 0.10 0.19 0.19 92
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Table 4.15 Estimated Kaplan-Meier Hazard and Survival Rate of Return 
to Work in Australia
Time out after displacement 













NOTE: Sample size is 390, of whom 305 are observed returning to work.  Maximum
observed duration in sample is 40 months.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.16 Determinants of Probability of Exit from Non-employment—
Marginal Effects for Australia
Covariates Col. 1 2












































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Marginal effects are calculated at average
values of other explanatory variables.  Marginal effects for dummy variables are for
effect of a change from 0 to 1 in that variable.  ** = Statistically significant at the 5%
level.
360Table 4.17 Predisplacement and Postdisplacement Work Time in Australia (ratio of worktime in quarter 
postdisplacement to worktime in quarter prior to displacement)
Quarter
postdisplacement
Total hours Total weeks Observations
All Males Females All Males Females All Males Females
1 0.213** 0.214** 0.220** 0.221** 0.203** 0.223** 389 205 184
2 0.518** 0.533** 0.519** 0.556** 0.585** 0.520** 377 198 179
3 0.576** 0.591** 0.578** 0.598** 0.599** 0.597** 354 189 165
4 0.631** 0.649** 0.631** 0.619** 0.651** 0.578** 345 183 162
5 0.701** 0.740** 0.676** 0.677** 0.727** 0.616** 332 176 156
6 0.717** 0.802** 0.630 0.703** 0.776** 0.610** 309 165 144
7 0.743** 0.780 0.718 0.723** 0.767 0.664 276 152 124
8 0.791 0.831 0.764 0.748 0.796 0.684 268 148 120
Average
predisplacement
425.13 433.97 398.34 12.06 12.06 12.06 n.a.a n.a. n.a.
NOTE: ** = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
a n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations
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Table 4.18 Predisplacement and Postdisplacement Average Log Weekly Earnings in Australia (postdisplacement 
job minus predisplacement job)
Years after 
displacement
Full-time + part-time Full-time
All Males Females All Males Females




























No. of obs. 1,085 539 546 921 492 429

































Full-time + part-time Full-time
All Males Females All Males Females




























Obs. 412 207 205 345 181 164
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4.19 Determinants of Ratio of Predisplacement and Postdisplacement Weekly Earnings in Australia
   Dependent 
            variable
Explanatory
variablesa
Log (weekly earnings 1–2 yr. 
postdisplacement)
Log (weekly earnings 
predisplacement)
Log (weekly earnings 1–2 yr. 
postdisplacement/weekly
earnings predisplacement)
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
























































































   Dependent 
            variable
Explanatory
variablesa
Log (weekly earnings 1–2 yr. 
postdisplacement)
Log (weekly earnings 
predisplacement)




































Adj. R2 0.720 0.750 0.652 0.654 0.427 0.421
F-statistic 380.39** 268.79** 277.49** 172.45* 98.44** 75.01**
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  A dash (—) means the variable was not included.  ** = Statistically significant at the 5%
level.






Each wave of the BHPS has an individual file and a job-history file.  The
individual file contains three reference points about jobs, the current job, the
Sept. 1 this year job and the Sept. 1 last year job.  Each of these has a job iden-
tifier, in the form of the spell number in the spell history that relates to this ref-
erence point.  For some individuals whose current state is the same as that in
the previous year, the current spell identifier in later waves links these jobs.
Otherwise, linking job spells between waves is tenuous, based upon matching
information about the jobs. The simplest way to join the waves is to assume that
the Sept. 1 reference points can be reasonably linked. Thus the Sept. 1 this year
of the previous wave should correspond to the Sept. 1 last year of the current
wave.
Problems can arise, resulting from the nature of the current job, which cor-
responds to the interview date in that wave. This job spell has the only recorded
information about certain important job-description variables, specifically the
variables for the number of hours worked, full-time or part-time status, tempo-
rary or permanent status, and union membership. Only six observation points
are available for these variables.  It can be difficult to match this current job
spell to a subsequent wave, except by matching such basic information about
the jobs as the start date, occupation, and industry.  Inconsistencies in recorded
information can make this very difficult, since even the labor-force state for the
spell does not always match for the best link points of Sept. 1 this year and Sept.
1 last year.  The design of the survey provides some overlap information when
the waves are linked, and also when the job history is linked to the individual
response, such that corresponding dates or periods of  any state might be
matched.
DEFINING DISPLACEMENT
To define a displaced worker, responses are coded on the basis of a self-
defined “reason for leaving last job” question.1 The range of classifications al-
lows us to separate layoffs from redundancy and end-of-temporary-job-con-
tract.  In Britain the two categories layoffs and redundancy are usually
synonymous. “Short-term layoffs,” after which workers can be recalled to the
same job, do not usually occur in Britain.  Britain also differs from many main-
366 Borland, Gregg, Knight, and Wadsworth
land European countries, in which (sometimes enshrined in law) short-term
contracts must be followed by a permanent job if the contract is renewed.
Short-term contracts are used in Britain but they are not linked explicitly to any
future permanent status. 
The tenure of the job is an important part of statutory redundancy provi-
sions, however, with two years’ tenure being the significant threshold within
this law beyond which entitlement to redundancy and sickness pay begins.
Inconsistencies in recorded information can mean that the spell lengths are
not always clear.  One obvious example is that some exit job spell lengths are
greater than the age of the respondent.  Both start and end dates suffer problems
and spells can overlap, or there can be undefined gaps, even when only months
and years are used.
Reconciling the data from the individual (indresp) and job-history (jbhist)
record files, sourced from different question specifications and sequences with-
in the survey, there is a reasonable level of agreement, but some differences ex-
ist which are not generally systematic.  Reconciling information within a wave
(matching the indresp and jbhist) results in generally better agreement than rec-
onciling consecutive waves, but data conflicts between them result in multiple
possible records rather than a single panel record for some individuals.  The
analysis relies on spell lengths, so for missing start dates substantial effort was
spent in processing the data, but only if the start year was not missing (since it
was deemed too difficult to make any reasonable assumptions about the year).
Thus an effort was made to reduce untrue left and right censoring.  Following
Paull (1997), only months and years are used for dates.  Seasons are recoded to
months.  We assume that years suffer less recall error than months and that any
time gap is an error, since spells in the job history are recorded consecutively.
Where consecutive spells exist within a wave, the previous spell end month is
substituted for a missing start month if the year is the same, and for the current
spell the interview month is substituted if the start year  is the same as the in-
terview year.  For end dates (which only exist for job history spells, not the cur-
rent job), where consecutive spells exist within a wave, the missing previous
spell end month is replaced with the following spell start month. 
Spell lengths for the current spell are created by taking the recorded tenure
variable measured in days and dividing by 30, since no end date exists.  For all
other spells, (the end year x 12 plus the end month) –  (start year x 12 plus the
start month) is constructed.
Race, age, and gender are only asked when the respondent first enters the
panel, and must be copied across.  Spell identifiers and job identifiers are used
to match job information in the spells and the only file data where a job descrip-
tor data item is missing. 
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The annual employment by industry is also added to the data set in the form
of a change variable.  This data is sourced from the published statistics 1990–
1995 in the Employment Gazette.  It is matched to the industry the displaced
worker left from. 
In order to minimize selection bias due to attrition, we use all individuals




Displaced worker: Persons who did not have a job at the time of the survey
and who responded that being “laid off” was a “very important” or “fairly im-
portant” reason for ending their last job.  Questions on reasons for job loss were
asked in October 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1993 for the 1961 cohort, and in Oc-
tober 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1993 for the 1965 cohort.
Months since displacement: Date of displacement is identified as first
month prior to survey date in which the respondent did not work full-time or
part-time.
Educational attainment: Variable constructed from information on years
of schooling and on whether a postschool qualification was obtained.  Individ-
uals reporting having completed high school or reporting having any
postschool qualification are classified as being in the category “Complete HS/
Postschool qualifications.”
Age: Equal to year of displacement minus year of birth.
Year: Equal to year of displacement.
Reading aptitude/Math aptitude: Scores from tests administered to respon-
dents as 14-year-olds by Australian Council of Education Research.
Rate of unemployment in last occupation: Rate of unemployment by 1-
digit CCLO occupation (From ABS, Labor Force Survey, Catalogue No.
6203.0, selected issues).
Weekly earnings in predisplacement job/Weekly earnings X to (X + 1)
years after displacement: Information obtained from question on “weekly earn-
ings last week.”
Total weeks of work in quarter, x months after displacement: Information
from labor market diary.  Respondents answering that they were employed
part-time or full-time in a month were assumed to have 4 and one-third weeks
of work in that month.
Total hours of work in quarter x months after displacement: Information
from labor market diary.  Respondents answering that they were employed
part-time in a month were assumed to have worked for 85 hours in that month.
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Respondents answering that they were employed full-time in a month were as-
sumed to have worked 170 hours in that month.
Total weeks/hours of work in quarter prior to displacement: Information
from labor market diary.  Date of displacement is identified as first month prior
to survey date in which the respondent did not work full-time or part-time.  To-
tal weeks/hours of work in the preceding quarter are then calculated using the
same assumptions as for weeks/hours of work per quarter after displacement.
Appendix Note
1. The following choices are offered: promoted/left for a better job, left for a differ-
ent job, was made redundant/company went bankrupt, was dismissed or sacked, a
temporary job ended, took retirement, stopped for health reasons, left to have a
baby, children/home care, care of other person, other reason.
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Table 4A.1 Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rates for Single-Earner 
Households in Britain, 1995
Table 4A.2 Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rates for Single-Earner 
Households in Australia, 1995
Group % of APWa % of 2/3 APW
First month, no social assistance
Gross – single 16 24
Net of tax/other
Couple – no children 26 39
Couple – 2 children 35 52
Couple – 2 children – housing benefit 77 90
60th month, with social assistance
Gross – couple no children 25 38
Net of tax/other
Couple – 2 children – housing benefit 77 90
NOTE: Gross replacement rates are before tax.  Net replacement rates are after tax and
other benefits.
a APW = average production worker earnings.
SOURCE: OECD (1997, Table 2.1).
Australia OECD
Replacement rate in 1st month of unemployment
Gross replacement rate
Single 22 52
Couple (no children) 40 52
Net replacement rate
Couple (no children) 49 60
Couple (2 children) 64 68
Couple (2 children, housing benefits) 71 73
Replacement rate in 60th month of unemployment
Gross replacement rate
Couple (no children) 40 19
Couple (2 children, housing benefits) 71 67
NOTE: Gross replacement rates are before tax.  Net replacement rates are after tax and
other benefits.
SOURCE: OECD (1997, Table 2.1).
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